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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statistical databases typically contain sensitive and 
confidential information about individuals and enterprises. 
The information might, for example,.be obtained from medical 
records or from a population census. The purpose of the 
database is to provide statistical summaries of the informa-
tion in response to user queries to support activities such 
as economic planning or scientific research. 
The u.s. legal code requires that sensitive information 
associated with individuals be protected from unauthorized 
release. At the same time, those data should be available to 
the public for statistical analysis. No sequ~nce of queries 
should be sufficient to deduce further information about any 
individual described in the database. Determining, then 
enforcing, a policy specifying what information in a data-
base can be given in response to queries is the database 
security problem [1, 2]. 
Inference control in statistical databases is an impor-
tant issue, since many current types of research are depen-
dent heavily upon statistical data that must preserve the 
confidentiality of individual information. A database whose 
information may be deduced by a finite mechanism is said to 
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be compromised. Dobkin, et al [3], show that users can com-
promise databases by simply asking a series of statistical 
queries. 
For example, a database of employee salaries; the salary 
of each employee is stored along with other key information 
concerning the employee. Normal system protocol may 
restrict user to query the system in the following way: 
"What is the median salary of {Si} ?" ••• (i) 
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where "{Si}" specifies a set of K employees. An answer to 
such a query is the value of the median salary, but not who 
earns it. The database is compromised by the user if the 
user can determine some employee's salary. In [3], it is 
shown that even if queries are restricted to the form (i) 
and the answers are true, it always is possible to compro-
mise the database in (3/2(k+l))+l queries [23]; where k is 
the size of median sample and is assumed to be fixed for all 
allowable queries. 
Security is also an issue for operating systems. Unfor-
tunately, the solutions for operating systems are not suffi-
cient to solve database security problems. Most operating 
system protection mechanisms are "access control mechanisms" 
[4-13]; that is, they enforce rules about who can perform 
what operations or access what information. In operating 
system protection mechanisms, different users have different 
access rights to the same object, they allow some users to 
read part or all of the contents of a file and others to 
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alter it in perhaps limited ways. In statistical databases, 
all users essentially are performing read access. An access 
control mechanism that only distinguishes between read and 
alter accesses is not useful. 
Another contrast between databases and operating systems 
concerns queries that involve many data elements. In the 
operating system, a complex operation can be broken into a 
set of accesses to individual objects and each access per-
mission is determined independently of the others. In a 
database, a decision must be made whether the entire query 
should be permitted in the first place. This decision 
depends not .only on the relationship of data elements being 
interrogated but also on the query history, the information 
that has already been divulged to the user. 
Newer access control mechanisms take into account the 
flow of information out of one object and into another as 
part of the effect of an access. These access control mech-
anisms incorporate remembering the source from which infor-
mation encoded in an object was derived [10, 38, 39]. Yet 
even such sophisticated mechanisms make no interpretation of 
the contents of the database and have no notion of the his-
tory of information already given out. Thus the operating 
system approach is not sufficient for the database problem 
[ 3 ] • 
Since operating system security methods are not robust 
enough for databases, researchers are seeking alternate 
methods for securing databases. Some of these methods are: 
controls on the size of query sets, controls on the overlap 
of query sets, distorting the data or the query responses, 
random sampling, and selection methods. All these methods 
are discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
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Even when modern inference control mechanisms are imple-
mented, researchers observed that compromising a statistical 
database is fairly easy. The major result of a series of 
papers is that "compromise is straightforward and cheap" 
[14], to quote Denning's and Schwartz's conclusion [15]. 
The demand for statistical database security is higher 
because relatively ·more computerized information is main-
tained in databases than in the recent past~ On the other 
hand, a good solution for this problem is yet to be 
achieved. 
The conclusion of a careful study of past and current 
research in this area, by the author, is that the database 
security problems for statistical databases cannot be solved 
by implying any one security method alone. Therefore a new 
method of inference control for statistical databases is 
presented. The new method combines three existing methods. 
These methods are "restricting the size of the query set", 
"restricting the overlap of query set", and "distorting the 
query response". The purpose of using the first two techni-
ques is to make it difficult for the questioner to isolate a 
single record. If the isolation of a single record occurs 
5 
in response to a series of queries, then the database system 
. transfers the control to a third layer of protection which 
generates a very carefully calculated (incorrect but statis-
tically acceptable) response. In this way the information 
in the isolated record is protected by giving an incorrect 
answer to the query. The details of the new method are 
given in chapter 3. Chapter 4 contains the evaluation of 
the new method and comparison of performance between exist-
ing systems and the new method with the help of examples. 
Chapter 5 contains the conclusion and the suggestions for 
future work. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED WORK 
Database compromise occurs when a questioner deduces, 
from the responses of one or more queries, confidential 
information of which he was previously unaware [2]. 
Researchers have studied methods of controlling compromise 
but have found for each method either that it succumbs to 
simple attacks, or that it is impractical to use. Recently 
the problem of protecting information has been investigated 
extensively. The. survey by Denning and Denning [16] dis-
cusses four kinds of safeguards: access controls, flow con-
trols, data encryption, and inference controls. Another 
survey by Denning [17] deals only with inference controls. 
Most of the attacks are based on isolating a single data 
element at the intersection of several query sets. The con-
fidential value is obtained by solving a system of equations 
employing the response of these queries. The defense against 
these attacks are of five kinds: control on the size of 
query sets, control on the overlap of the query sets, dis-
torting the data or the query responses, sampling from the 
database, and selection methods. These controls are reviewed 
briefly in this chapter. 
6 
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Control on the Size of Query Set 
The minimum query size control aims to defend against 
attacks employing very large or very small query sets. e.g., 
with a formula, C, that identifies a single record [2, 18]. 
Let k denote a parameter giving the lower bound on allowable 
query set size. A query q(C) is not answered unless 
k<=nc<=N-k. where, N is the number of confidential records 
in the database, C is a characteristic formula which, infor-
mally, is any logical formula over the values using the 
operators AND(.), OR(+), and NOT(-), and nc is the number of 
records in the database whose values match with the charac-
teristic formula C. Unfortunately, thfs control is often 
subverted easily even for k near N/2 [21], by a simple 
snooping tool called the "tracker" [15, 19, 20]. The basic 
idea of the tracker is to pad small query sets with enough 
extra records to make them answerable, then eliminate the 
effect of the extra records. Suppose that a questioner, who 
knows from external sources that an individual I is charac-
terized by the logical formula C, is able to express C in 
the form C=(A.B) such that queries for the formulas A and 
(A.B) are both answerable, then formula T=(A.B) is the 
tracker (of I) because it helps the questioner to "track 
down" additional characteristics of I. The method of com-
promise is summarized on the next page [15]. 
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Individual Tracker Compromise. 
Let C=(A.B) be a formula identifying individual I, and 
suppose T=(A.B) is I's tracker. With three answerable quer-
ies, calculate: 
COUNT(C) = COUNT(A) - COUNT (T) ( 1 ) 
COUNT(C.a) = COUNT(T + A.a) - COUNT(T) (2) 
If COUNT(C.a) = 0, I does not have characteristic a. 
If COUNT(C.a) = COUNT(C), I has characteristic a. 
If COUNT(C) = 1, arbitrary statistics about I can be com-
puted from 
q(C) = q(A) - Q(T) ( 3 ) 
a~ q(C.a) = q(T + A.a) - q(T) (4) 
When COUNT(C) > 1, it may happen that no compromise is pos-
sible. The following example illustrates the individual 
tracker compromise for database of Table I, with k=2. 
EXAMPLE 1. The query set size restriction implies that 
a query q(C) is answerable only if 2<=COUNT(C)<=10. A ques-
tioner believes that 
C = "F.CS.Prof" 
characterizes Dolly, but the restriction k=2 prevents him 
asking the queries 
COUNT (F.CS.Prof) = 1 
COUNT (F.CS.prof.$20KSal) = 1 
to determine Dolly's salary. However, the questioner can 
make a tracker T=A.B, where A= "F" and B = "CS.Prof". To 
verify that Dolly is the only individual characterized by C, 
the questioner applies eq. (1): 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof) = COUNT(F) - COUNT(F.CS.Prof) 
= 5 - 4 
= 1. 
To discover Dolly's salary, the questioner would have to 
search using repeated applications of eq. (2). If he 
guessed $25K, eq. (2) would yield 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof.$25KSal) = COUNT(F.CS.Prof + F.$25KSal) 
- COUNT(F.CS.Prof) 
= 4 - 4 
= 0, 
revealing that Dolly's salary cannot be $25K. As soon as 
the questioner guesses $20K, eq. (2) yields 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof.$20KSal) = COUNT(F.CS.Prof + F.$20KSal) 
- COUNT(F.CS.Prof) 
= 5 - 4 
= 1, 
revealing that Dolly's salary is $20K. 
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It might seem that the effort to compromise the entire 
database is very high because the questioner would have to 
know identifying characteristics of each individual in order 
to construct a tracker for that individual. However, if a 
questioner can find any formula whose query set contains at 
least 2k but not more than N-2k records [16], he can use the 
formula as a "general tracker" to determine the answer to 
any unanswerable query of the database [15]. The method of 
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compromise is given below. 
General Tracker Compromise 
The value of any unanswerable query q(C) can be computed 
as follows using any general tracker T. First calculate 
Q = q(T) + q(T). (5) 
If COUNT(C)<k, the queries on the right-hand side of eq. 
(6) are answerable: 
q(C) = q(C+T) + q(C+T) - Q. (6) 
Otherwise COUNT(C)>N-k and the queries on the right-hand 
side of equation (7) are answerable: 
q(C) = 2Q- q(~+T) - q(~+T). ( 7 ) 
Because at least one of the eqs. (6) or (7) is calculable, 
q(C) can be evaluated with at most 4 queries beyond the 2 
required to find Q. The following example illustrates the 
general tracker compromise for the database of Table I, with 
k=2. 
EXAMPLE 2. The questioner, who knows that Dolly is a 
female CS professor, seeks to discover her salary. To be 
answerable, a query set size must fall in the range (2, 10), 
but a general tracker's query set size must fall in the 
subrange [4, 8]. The formula T = "M" qualifies as a general 
tracker since COUNT(M) = 7. The questioner applies eq. (5) 
for counting and summing queries to discover the database 
size (N) and total of all salaries (S): 
N = COUNT(M) + COUNT(M) 
= 7 + 5 
= 12. 
S = SUM(M;Sal) + SUM(M;Sal) 
= $101K + $99K 
= $200K. 
The questioner verifies that Dolly is the only female CS 
professor by applying eq. (6) with counting queries: 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof) = COUNT(F.CS.Prof + M) 
+ COUNT(F.CS.Prof + M) - N 
= 8 + 5 - 12 
= 1. 
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He then calculates her salary by applying eq. (6) with sum-
ming queries: 
SUM(F.CS.Prof;Sal) = SUM(F.CS.Prof + M;Sal) 
+ SUM(F.CS.Prof + M;Sal) - S 
= $121K + $99K - $200K 
= $20K. 
The above two examples show that tracker compromise is 
clearly a powerful technique to compromise databases. 
Control on the Overlap of the Query Set 
The minimum overlap control inhibits the responses from 
queries that have more than a predetermined number of 
records in common with each prior query [3]. No efficient 
implementation of this control is known [21]. Before 
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responding, the query program could have to compare the cur-
rent query group against every previous one. This control 
may be subverted by queries that overlap by small amounts 
(e.g., by solving a system of equations) [3, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
40]. 
An effective method of preventing a clever intruder from 
isolating a record by overlapping queries is "partitioning 
the database" [26, 36]. Records are stored in groups, each 
containing at least some predetermined number of records. 
Queries may apply to any set of groups, but never to subsets 
of records within any group. Therefore it is impossible to 
isolate a record. A variant is called "microaggregation". 
Individuals are grouped to create many synthetic "average 
individuals". Statistics are computed for these synthetic 
individuals rather than the real ones [37]. 
Partitioning has two severe practical limitations in 
dynamic databases. First, the free flow of useful statisti-
cal information can be inhibited severely either by exces-
sively large groups or by ill-considered groupings. Second, 
forming and reforming groups as records are inserted, 
updated, and deleted from the database can lead to costly 
bookkeeping [21]. 
Distorting the Data or Query Response 
The minimum query size controls and minimum overlap con-
trols give exact answers when they respond. "Rounding" aims 
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to prevent inference by perturbing the responses. Under 
"direct rounding", the answer to a query is rounded up or 
down by a small amount before it is released [27, 28]. 
Rounding by adding a zero-mean random value (noise) is inse-
cure since the correct answer can be deduced by averaging a 
sufficient number of responses to the same query [21]. 
Rounding by adding a pseudorandom value that depends on the 
data is preferable, because then a given query always 
returns the same response. The method can sometimes be sub-
verted with trackers by adding dummy records to the database 
[29] or simply comparing the response to several queries in 
order to narrow the range of values containing the confi-
dential value [30]. 
A method of indirect rounding is called "error inocula-
tion". This control aims to prevent inference by perturbing 
or replacing the values stored in records [31]. Like direct-
rounding, this control attempts to trade accuracy in the 
statistics for security. One method is to modify the data 
when the record is created (losing the original data). The 
problem with this approach is that correctness of the raw 
data may be essential for other uses; e.g., storage and 
retrieval of patient's medical records. A better approach 
stores a "perturbation factor" in the record along with the 
original data and applies this factor when the data are used 
in a query [31]. 
A variation of error inoculation which may not disturb 
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the accuracy of the statistics is "multidimensional 
transformation" or "data swapping". The values of fields of 
records are exchanged so that the record for any particular 
individual is likely to be incorrect, but maintains the same 
frequency count statistics as the original data. Data swap-
ping reduces the risk of compromise since there is no way of 
knowing with which individual a disclosed value is actually 
associated. The problem with this approach is that no effi-
cient method exists either for finding groups of records 
whose values can be swapped, or for determining whether a 
valid swap even exists is known. Since exact data swapping 
is not feasible practically, Reiss [33] suggested a feedback 
algorithm to· find an approximate data swap on a categorical 
data set. Approximate data swapping is still in an experi-
mental stage, and its computational efficiency has yet to be 
determined. Furthermore, approximate data swapping is. not 
feasible for noncategorical data such as salary figures 
[32]. 
Conway and Strip [34] suggested value distortion, in 
which the value of a restricted field would be modified by 
some random quantity before retrieving the value to the 
query. That is, 
Vd = Va + Vr 
where, Vd, is the distorted value. Va, the actual value, 
and, Vr, a random deviate with a given distribution, d. The 
+ sign in the formula implies that this strategy is applica-
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ble only to fields with arithmetic values. One can imagine 
random distortion of character-valued fields (perhaps by 
random displacement in the collating sequence), but it is 
hard to imagine the resulting Vd being of any use whatever. 
The distribution, d, is chosen to have an expected value 
of zero so that Vd is an unbiased estimater of the true 
value, Va. It is not always obvious what would constitute an 
appropriate distribution. If Va in the statistical database 
is symmetric, then the random deviate distribution probably 
should be symmetric. But if the Va is highly skewed, which 
is a common occurrence [32], then the choice of the distri-
bution is much more difficult. 
Random Samples 
All the controls listed above are subverted by a single 
basic principle of compromise. Because the questioner can 
control the composition of each query set, he can isolate a 
single record or value by intersecting query sets. Rounding 
and error inoculation perturb the responses, but the "noise" 
can often be removed by averaging responses for carefully 
selected query sets. 
The u.s. Census Bureau has used a technique that responds 
to queries that involve only a random subfile of the data-
base, rather than the complete database. In "random sam-
pling" the user can apply responses to a set of records no 
longer selected by him. This prevent inference by depriving 
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him of the ability to isolate a known record. The 1960 u.s. 
Census, for example, was distributed on tape as a random 
sample of one record in 1000 [27]. The best snooper would 
have at best a 1/1000 chance of associating a given sample 
record with the right individual. This technique is applica-
ble to large databases only. Because a small random sample 
will be useless, other methods are needed to prevent compro-
mise of small databases. 
Selection Methods 
Some researchers have considered key specified queries 
which selects some element from the query set~ e.g., the 
median, the largest, or the smallest data values [3, 23]. 
In [23], the selection of response to any query is any value 
within the query set, which need not be the right one. For 
example, the database in response to a query: 
"median salary (Brown, Black, White, Red)" 
simply may decide to return White's salary, whether or not 
White's salary is actually the median salary. The problem 
with this type of system is that the answer is chosen within 
the query set and repeated queries with overlap can deduce 
the right information in about 4k 2 queries, where k is the 
query size [23]. 
Recently Schierman, Jonge, and Riet have presented a 
method in which the database refuses to give answer to a 
query, if the right answer reveals the secret [35]. Even 
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this complex system is not secure, because, the user with 
the responses of the past queries and a little logical clev-
erness, can deduce the right answer. It is because of the 
fact that the database refuses to respond only when a secret 
is likely to be revealed. 
The net result of the above survey is that it is very 
difficult to protect a statistical database. Every method is 
unsafe against at least one type of attack. In the next 
chapter a new method is presented. The new method is a com-
bination of three of the above mentioned techniques with 
some variations. 
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TABLE I 
HYPOTHETICAL DATABASE OF EMPLOYEES 
OF A UNIVERSITY 
NO NAME SEX DEPT POST SAL($K) DONAT($) 
1 ABLE M cs PROF 20 50 
2 BOB M ENG PROF 15 150 
3 CARY F EE PROF 25 150 
4 DOLLY F cs PROF 20 65 
5 EDDY M STAT PROF 15 0 
6 FLYNN F STAT ADM 23 150 
7 GATE M MATH PROF 12 20 
8 HOME M cs PROF 16 450 
9 IAN F cs STU 6 60 
10 JIM M STAT ADM 18 15 
11 KATE F MATH PROF 25 100 
12 LAMB M cs STU 5 0 
TABLE II 
EXAMPLES OF QUERIES FOR DATABASE 
OF TABLE I 
FORMAL QUERY ANSWER INFORMAL STATE 
COUNT(F.CS) 2 
COUNT (M • Adm . (EE + Stat)) 1 
SUM (F + Math; Sal) . $126K 
SUM ($25K Sal; Donat) $250 
SUM (Donat > $100; Sal) $79K 
# of females in CS 
Dept. 
# of male adm in EE 
or Stat Depts. 
Total of salaries 
among either males 
or Math Dept Perso-
nnel. 
Total of donations 
~~/K~sons earning 
Total of salaries of 
persons donating 
more than $100. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NEW METHOD OF INFERENCE CONTROL 
The major cause for the leakage of information from sta-
tistical databases is that the user can isolate a single 
record containing information about a particular individual, 
by means of a series of queries. The new method for infer-
ence control is devised such that it will prevent the leak-
age of information even when the user isolates a single 
record successfully. Three layers of protection are incor-
porated int9 the new system to achieve the desired results. 
(i) When a questioner has complete control over the query 
set, and when the responses are undistorted, then compromise 
is easy [16]. The principle of this compromise is simple. 
The questioner finds a formula, C, whose query set count is 
1. He can then discover whether the individual thus isolated 
has any other characteristics, X, by asking "How many indi-
viduals satisfy C(AND)X ?" The response "1" indicates that 
X is characteristics of the individual and "0" indicates 
not. The basic idea of this protection layer is given 
below: 
Do not respond to queries for which there are fewer 
than k, or, more than N-K records in the query set. 
Where N is the total number of records in the database, 
and k>O. 
The positive integer K in this control is a design parameter 
20 
21 
specifying the smallest allowable size of a query set. If 
the query language permits complementation, then a maximum 
size N-K of the query set must also be enforced, for other-
wise the questioner could pose his queries relative to the 
complement (C) of the desired characteristics (C). The 
value of k for this system is kept as low as 2. The above 
method alone is not sufficient protection from tracker based 
inquiries; therefore, the setond layer of protection is 
incorporated. 
(ii) Tracker based compromises employ groups of records 
having high overlaps [16]. To protect against trackers a 
minimum overlap control is taken into consideration. The 
basic idea of this control is: 
Do not respond to a query that has more than a predet-
ermined number of records in common with any prior 
query. 
The only difficulty in this type of control is that, before 
responding, the query program would be required to compare 
the latest query group against every previous one. This can 
be achieved by maintaining a log of all the queries asked in 
a session. If there is a chance that the log file can grow 
indefinitely, then some upper bound can be placed on the 
number of queries a questioner can ask in one session. No 
compromise is possible if overlapping of fields are not 
allowed, but at the same time the task of getting statistics 
out of database becomes very difficult. Overlapping of two 
(2) fields is both sufficiently convenient for the users and 
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highly effective against tracker based queries. 
Even if the above two techniques are applied to the query 
program, the isolation of a single record is not preventable 
completely; however, it takes many more queries and a great 
deal of user's time to perform the task of isolation than it 
would without these techniques. A third level of protection 
is needed and to accommodate this technique in the system 
the basic idea of (i) is modified slightly: 
Respond to all queries for which there are more than or 
equal to K, or, fewer than or equal toN-K records in 
query set. For queries which have fewer thanK, or, 
more than N-K records in the query set, do not give 
direct response but activate the third layer of protec-
tion. 
if the query set is one (1) or N-1, the system still 
responds to the query, but the response given is not from 
the query set, rather, it is generated by the system ran-
domly. The answers are generated such that every time the 
same query is asked, the system gives the same response. 
This can be achieved by taking into account the data stored 
in the record. This is true even when the data stored in the 
database in non-numeric. The random number generator can 
take the non-numeric fields, change them into numeric fields 
by taking the ASCII or EBCDIC equivalents. The response 
does not depend upon the full record under isolation, but on 
the fields which the query references. This way different 
queries to the same record get different responses, and 
hence protect the information. Until the data stored in the 
record is changed, the questioner receives the same response 
whenever he asks the same query, in the same session or in 
different sessions, and hence prevent any inconsistency in 
calculating statistics. 
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This added protection of giving incorrect answers if a 
single record is isolated along with the other two techni-
ques can prevent disclosure of information very success-
fully. In this system the value of K is kept as low as 2, 
compared to the limit of N/2 of some of the other systems. 
As the actual data in the database is not distorted in any 
way, it is possible to incorporate privileged access for any 
person who has the authority to access the complete database 
as it is; e.g., a doctor getting a patient's medic~! his-
tory, or the head of a firm getting the personal dossier of 
his employee due for promotion, etc. The basic logical flow 
of the system is shown in fig 1. Each of the three system 
when applied alone could not prevent the deduction of pri-
vate information, but, when applied together may very well 
protect the database as shown in chapter 4. 
OVERLAP 
VIOLATION 
MESSAGE 
GIVE TRUE 
RESPONSE 
( LOG Q;; ) 
~--.--------------' 
GENERATE NUMBER 
RANDOMLY BETWEEN 
N*3/4 and N-2 
YES 
YES 
QUERY (Q) 
GIVE TRUE 
RESPONSE 
STOP 
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GENERATE NUMBER 
RANDOt1LY BETWEEN 2 & 
N/4 
FIGURE 1. Logical Flow Diagram of the 
New Method 
CHAPTER IV 
EVALUATION OF THE NEW METHOD 
In this chapter, every possible query that may compromise 
a database is posed on the database of Table I under differ-
ent systems, including the new method. The response of quer-
ies for these systems are noted to compare the superiority 
of performance among systems. Usually COUNT, SUM, AVERAGE, 
and MEDIAN types of queries are used to get the statistics 
from the statistical databases, but since COUNT and SUM 
queries are used in tracker based compromise, only these two 
are considered here. The examples of queries for the data-
base of Table I are expressed formally and informally in 
Table II. 
Once again the rules which the new method follows to give 
response to queries are summerized below. 
1) Check whether the current query overlaps more than two 
fields with any of the prior queries: 
a) if 'NO', go to 2. 
b) if 'YES', the query response will be '0-V' 
(overlap violation). 
2) Check the size of query set: 
a) if between 2 & N-2, then give true response. 
b) if either 1 or N-1, then go to 3. 
25 
26 
3) Check the size of the query set: 
a) if 1, then generate random number between 2 and 
N/4. 
b) if N-1, then generate random number between 
N*3/4 and N-2. 
The above three rules when applied in the query responses 
will be pointed out by their number. 
Consider the database of table I and suppose that no 
restriction is posed on queries. A questioner who tries to 
find Dolly's salary poses the following queries: 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof) = 1 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof.$20KSal) = 1 
in just two queries he finds out the information and compro-
mises the database. 
Now suppose the database of table I incorporates the con-
trol on the size of the query set and k=2, i.e., 
2<=COUNT(C)<=l0. The questioner posing the same two queries 
gets the following response: 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof) = ### 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof.$20KSal) = ### 
As the query set of both the queries is 1, the database ref-
uses to give any response. This refusal of database reveals 
to the questioner that the query sets have violated either 
the lower or the upper limit of query set. Since the normal 
queries are not helpful in this situation, the questioner 
applies the individual tracker based queries to find Dolly's 
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salary. Since C = (F.CS.Prof), he applies eq. 1 & 2 (pageS) 
and forms A=(F), B=(CS.Prof), and T=(F.CS.Prof). He asks 
the following queries: 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof) = COUNT(F) - COUNT(F.CS.Prof) 
= 5 - 4 
= 1. 
He now knows that C uniquely identifies Dolly, and poses two 
more queries for her salary: 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof.$20KSal) = COUNT(F.CS.Prof + F.$20KSal) 
- COUNT(F.CS.Prof) 
= 5 - 4 
= 1, 
which reveal that Dolly's salary is $20K. 
Now, incorporating the new method of protection into the 
database of table I, and asking the same query 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof). The query set of this query is 1, for 
which the Rule(2b) of the new system is applied. The new 
system generates the response randomly, say, 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof) = 3 (Rule # 3a) 
and the response to the query 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof.$20KSal) = 'O-V' (Rule # lb) 
because there are more than two fields common in both the 
queries. The questioner asks further queries and gets the 
following responses. 
COUNT(F.CS) = 2 (Rule # 2a) 
COUNT(F.Prof) = 3 (Rule # 2a) 
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COUNT(F.$20KSal) = 2 (Rule # 3a) 
COUNT(CS.Prof) = 3 (Rule # 2a) 
COUNT(CS.$20KSal) = 2 (Rule # 2a) 
COUNT(Prof.$20KSal) = 2 (Rule # 2a) 
The above queries are the only possible queries the ques-
tioner can ask without violating the overlap constraint and 
with these responses he is not sure what Dolly's salary is, 
because the value of the formula "F.CS.Prof.$20KSal" can not 
be determined by the above queries. 
Now assuming that the questioner after asking the query 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof), and getting the response 3, applies the 
individual tracker based queries to find Dolly's salary: 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof.$20KSal) = COUNT(F.CS.Prof + F.$20KSal) 
- COUNT(F.CS.Prof) 
Since query COUNT(F.CS.Prof) = 4 (Rule # 2a) has more than 2 
fields common with the other query the other query gets the 
response, 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof + F.$20KSal) = '0-V' (Rule # la) 
Since one of the queries is not answerable, the questioner 
remains unsuccessful. 
It is fair to assume that the questioner applies the 
tracker queries from the very begining. He first finds the 
count of female professors in the CS department; 1.e., 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof) = COUNT(F) - COUNT(F.CS.Prof) 
= 5 - 4 
= 1. 
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He determines that Dolly is the only female professor in CS 
department and asks queries for her salary, 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof.$20KSal) = COUNT(F.CS.Prof + F.$20KSal) 
- COUNT(F.CS.Prof) 
Since these are the same queries asked above, and at least 
one of them is not answerable under the new system (rule # 
la), the questioner remains unsuccessful in deducing Dolly's 
salary. 
In the last, general tradker based queries are posed on 
the database to find Dolly's salary. In the database of 
table I, the formula T = 'M' qualifies as a general tracker 
since COUNT(M) = 7. The questioner applies eq. 5 (pagelO) 
for counting and summing queries to discover the database 
size (N) and total of all salaries (S): 
N = COUNT(M) + COUNT(M) 
= 7 + 5 
= 12. 
S = SUM(M; Sal) + SUM(M; Sal) 
= $101K + $99K 
= $200K. 
The questioner tries to verify that Dolly is the only female 
CS professor by applying eq. (6) with counting queries: 
COUNT(F.CS.Prof) = COUNT(F.CS.Prof + M) 
+ COUNT(F.CS.Prof + M) - N 
but overlap violation once again blocks his way. He then 
tries to calculate her salary by applying eq. (6) with sum-
ming queries: 
SUM(F.CS.Prof;Sal) = SUM(F.CS.Prof + M;Sal) 
+ SUM(F.CS.Prof + M;Sal) - S 
and once again the database refuses to give response to at 
least one of the queries due to the overlap violation and 
hence prevents the disclosure of private information. 
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The new method is evaluated assuming a single questioner 
is trying to compromise the database. This system, however, 
may not be useful if more than one person try to compromise 
the database for the same information at different times and 
compute the result by comparing the responses to their quer-
ies. This type of (gang) compromise·is possible for the 
tracker based queries only, since they are always in the 
answerable limits of the databases. Since the tracker based 
queries have a set patt~rns, one way to solve this problem 
may be to put a check on every query asked to the system for 
its being tracker query. If a pattern is matched, then the 
possible combinations of the other tracker queries related 
to the first match are generated by the system internally 
and, then onward, every query asked by any user within a 
predetermined time (say one month) is checked for a match. 
For individual tracker of example 1, the following quer-
ies are asked: 
COUNT (F) 
COUNT (F.CS.Prof) 
. . . . ( i ) 
. . • . ( i i ) 
Since query (ii) is matched with the tracker query pattern 
of (A.i), the database generates all the possible matching 
queries: 
COUNT (F.CS.Prof + F.Sal) 
COUNT (F.CS.Prof + F.Donat) 
0 0 0 0 ( i i i ) 
0 0 0 0 ( i v) 
For general tracker, the following queries are asked: 
COUNT (M) 0 0 0 0 ( v) 
COUNT (M) 0 0 0 0 (vi) 
SUM (M; Sal) •••• (vii) 
SUM (M; Sal) •••• (viii) 
COUNT (F.CS.Prof + M) .••• (ix) 
Query (ix) matches the tracker query pattern (C+T), there-
fore the following eqs. are generated by the database: 
COUNT (F.CS.Prof + M) 
COUNT (F.CS.Prof + M) 
•••• (X) 
.••• (Xi ) 
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and for the query SUM(F.CS.Prof + M;Sal) the following eqs. 
are generated: 
SUM (F.CS.Prof + M· , Sal) •••• (xii) 
SUM (F.CS.Prof + M; Sal) .••• (xiii) 
Eqs. (iii), (iv), (X) ' (Xi) , (xii), and (xiii) are kept in a 
separate file and all other queries, asked by any user, will 
be compared to this file for a possible match. There is no 
response to the matched queries; hence this protects the 
database. 
Now the new method is tested for another database which 
is used in the paper by Denning D. E. [17]. The database 
is given in Table III. The questioner knows that "L" is a 
male director and a board member. To find the number of 
overdrafts taken by L, he applies the following queries: 
COUNT(M.DIR.MEM) = 3 
COUNT(M.DIR.MEM.OD=50) = 'O-V' 
(Rule # 3a) 
(Rule # lb) 
because there are more than two fields common in both the 
queries. The questioner asks further queries and gets the 
following responses. 
COUNT(M.DIR) = 2 (Rule # 3a) 
COUNT(M.MEM) = 3 (Rule # 2a) 
COUNT(M.OD=50) = 2 (Rule # 3a) 
COUNT(DIR.MEM) = 3 (Rule # 3a) 
COUNT(DIR.OD=50) = 2 (Rule # 3a) 
COUNT(MEM.OD=50) = 3 (Rule # 3a) 
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Above are the queries the questioner can ask without violat-
ing the overlap constraint and with these responses the 
value of the formula "M.DIR.MEM.OD=50" can not be deter-
mined. 
Since the normal queries are useless, the questioner 
applies the Individual Tracker queries. He forms the 
tracker as follows: 
c = (M.DIR.MEM) 
A = (M) 
B = (DIR.MEM) 
T = (M.DIR.MEM) 
He applies eq. (1) from page 8, and gets the following 
responses: 
COUNT(M.DIR.MEM) = COUNT(M) - COUNT(M.DIR.MEM) 
= 8 - 7 
= 1. 
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He finds out that L is the only male director who is also a 
board member. The questioner now applies eq. (2) from page 8 
to find out the number of overdrafts taken by L: 
COUNT(M.DIR.MEM.OD=50) = COUNT(M.DIR.MEM + M.OD=50) 
- COUNT(M.DIR.MEM) 
since the queries in eq. (2) have three fields in commom 
which violates the overlap constraint (rule # la) of the new 
method, the new method responds with 'O-V' for one of these 
queries. 
In the last, general tracker based queries are posed on 
the database to find L's number of over drafts. In the 
database of Table III, the formula T = 'M' qualifies as a 
general tracker since COUNT(M) = 8. The questioner applies 
eq. (5) from page 10, for counting and summing queries to 
discover the total number of over drafts (S): 
S = SUM(M; OD) + SUM(M; OD) 
= 108 + 3 
= 111. 
The questioner tries to apply eq. (6) with summing queries 
to find out L's over drafts: 
SUM(M.DIR.MEM; OD) = SUM(M.DIR.MEM + M; OD) 
+ SUM(M.DIR.MEM + M; OD) - S 
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and once again the database refuses to give response to at 
least one of the queries in eq. (6), due to the overlap vio-
lation. This way the disclosure of private information is 
prevented. 
By incorporating the new method of inference control, a 
statistical database may be made more secure than: 
control on the size of query set: because this system can be 
subverted by tracker queries, and the new method protects 
the information against these types of queries: 
control on the overlap of query set: because this control 
can be subverted by solving equations of the queries, and 
the new method is safe against this type of attack. Unlike 
Partitioning, the new method does not have any problem with 
the free flow of statistical information and does not need 
costly bookkeeping for update, insertion and deletion of 
records in the d~tabase: 
distorting the data or query responses: because the data 
stored in the database under the new method is original, 
unlike direct rounding, and can be used for other purposes. 
All the statistics returned by the new method are true val-
ues, unlike indirect rounding, except for the case where the 
query set is 1: • 
and above all, the new method protects the database against 
the gang compromise, and , that may make it a highly secure 
method for inference control, compared to any single method. 
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TABLE III 
REFERENCED DATABASE FROM DENNING'S 
PAPER [17] 
NO NAME SEX PROFESSION MEM OD AMOUNT($) 
1 A M LAWYER NO 1 10 
2 B M JOURNALIST NO 0 0 
3 c M PRESIDENT NO 0 0 
4 D M DOCTOR NO 2 100 
5 E M LAWYER YES 30 50,000 
6 F F LAWYER.· NO 0 0 
7 G F SENATOR NO 3 50 
8 H M LAWYER YES 25 10,000 
9 I F DOCTOR NO 0 0 
10 J M SENATOR NO 0 0 
11 K F JOURNALIST NO 0 0 
12 L M DIRECTOR YES 50 100,000 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A new method of inference control for statistical data-
base is presented and evaluated against all types of known 
attacks to deduce private information from statistical data-
bases. The system is especially evaluated for the most pow-
erful tools of compromise, the trackers, and shown to be 
highly secure, although not completely secure against gang 
attacks, over a period of time. The new method is a combi-· 
nation of three already existing methods, namely, control on 
the size of query set, control on the overlap of query set, 
and, distorting the response of the query only when the 
query isolates a single record. The new method always 
responses to the user queries of any type and hence prevents 
the guessing of responses by the questioner which leads to 
compromise. 
In the case of gang compromise, the efficiency and secur-
ity of the system depends on the number of records in the 
database, and, on the number of fields in the records. The 
larger the database, the more time system will spend in 
matching the queries, but the efficiency can be enhanced by 
maintaining the matching file at very regular intervals. 
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The new method implemented with the matching file system 
is feasible for any database of any size. For extremely 
larger databases having millions of records, the matching 
file system, however, will need extra care, otherwise the 
efficiency of the system will be effected adversly. 
The new method is only evaluated for COUNT and SUM quer-
ies. Possible future work may be to extend the method to 
handle the AVERAGE, MEDIAN and other queries. Also, the 
implementation of the new method on an available statistical 
database system will be an excellent way to find the practi-
cality of the system. 
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